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Croatia and Latvia are both small (64,589 km², population 4.5 million and 56,594 km², population 2.2 million). Both are poorly endowed with natural resources, which may be good for their long-run growth potential as suggested by Sachs and Warner (1995) and others, and both had cities or regions that prospered long ago. Latvia prospered when Riga and other Latvian cities became part of the Hanseatic League from 1282 onward. Croatia, or, more accurately, the Republic of Ragusa/Dubrovnik, also thrived through vivacious trade from around 1360 onward. Between the end of World War II and renewed independence in the early 1990s both countries were part of larger socialist or communist states. There were, however, important differences. Latvia, one of the fifteen Socialist Soviet Republics, had her economy organized along the lines of a classical socialist regime based on central planning, "decreed prices," monopolized foreign transactions, and absence of market institutions and markets. Croatia was an integral part of the non-aligned Socialist
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia that was politically and economically more open than eastern-bloc countries. Private enterprise in agriculture, trade, and small business played a much larger (and politically tolerated) role and larger (nationalized) enterprises had more freedom and room for manoeuvre through the evolving system of workers' self management.
Latvia, after regaining independence in 1991, quickly embarked on bold and decisive political, institutional, and economic reforms that were carried out by successive governments. We surmise that the prospect of rapid EU integration, "the EU perspective," provided a critical anchor for sustained political, institutional, and economic reforms across the political spectrum. by the IMF (~EUR 1.7 billion), the EU (~EUR 3.1 billion), the World Bank (EUR 0.4 billion), and the Nordic governments and other bilateral creditors (~EUR 2.3 billion) to stabilize the economic and financial situation and to put into place structural reforms.
In The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. As in Gylfason and Hochreiter (2009) , Section 2 lays out, in the simplest possible terms, the theoretical framework guiding the discussion to follow. In Section 3, selected economic, political, and social indicators are employed to illuminate the possible reasons for the economic trajectories of the two countries under review and how they differ. We present a simple growth accounting computation in an attempt to quantify the broad contours of the contributions of investment, education, and efficiency, including labor market arrangements and governance, to the income and growth differential between the two countries. 4 In Section 4, before summarizing our main findings, we briefly discuss the policy implications of the growth comparisons of the two countries and suggest potential lessons for other countries that lag behind their erstwhile equals. 4 Regression analysis along the lines of Schadler et al. (2006) is beyond the scope of the paper. Our sample period, 1991-2008, is too short for full-fledged growth econometrics. 
Analytical Background
Economic growth can be either extensive, driven forward by the accumulation of dead capital, or it can be intensive, in which case growth springs from more efficient use of existing capital and other resources. Among the numerous alternative ways of promoting economic and social efficiency, one of the most obvious is the accumulation of live capital -that is, human capital -through education, on-the-job training, and health care. There are many other ways as well to increase efficiency and economic growth. Adam Smith and David Ricardo showed how free trade can empower individuals, firms, and countries to break outside the production frontiers that, under autarky, would confine them to lower standards of life. Other examples abound, as the theory of endogenous economic growth and the empirical growth literature of recent years have made clear.
In the rapidly advancing literature on growth in formerly centrally planned economies (see, e.g., Fischer and Sahay, 2000, and Campos and Coricelli, 2002) , 5 Acemoglu it is now widely recognized that the quality of institutions and good governance can help generate sustained growth and so can also various other factors that are closely related to economic organization, institutions, and policy ( and Johnson, 2005, and Dixit, 2004) . 6 We want to understand whether the growth differential between Croatia and Latvia since 1991 can be traced mostly to efficiency (i.e., intensive growth), as we suspect, rather than accumulation (i.e., extensive growth).
A. Why Per Capita Outputs Differ
To set the stage, consider this Cobb-Douglas-type production function with constant returns to scale: With different rates of growth of the different determinants of growth, the rate of growth of per capita output must be a weighted combination of the growth rates of the different inputs. We can simplify the story somewhat by acknowledging that, apart from farmland, natural capital plays an insignificant macroeconomic role in the two countries under review, allowing us to set c = 0 in the production function. If we assume a = b = 1/3 in equations (1) and (2), the sum of the output elasticities of H and L -that is, of total labor, if you like -is 2/3 compared with an output elasticity of capital of 1/3, a familiar constellation of parameters (Mankiw, Romer, and Weil, 1992 
Even so, our post-communist sample period 1991-2007 dictates an emphasis not so much on the long-run growth of potential output as on the medium-term growth of the actual level of output.
In our equations above, the efficiency parameter A comprises a variety of factors, among them technological advances and other types of efficiency gains from various sources, including internal as well as external trade, "good" institutions, and "good"
governance (see Williamson, 2005, and Marsiliani and Renström, 2007) . Governance, in turn, is a broad concept, and subsumes managerial, fiscal, monetary, financial, and external governance, each of which comprises several components. The examination of some of these "unbundled" governance factors is at the core of our attempt to answer the question of why Latvia almost caught up with Croatia. However, we also need to compare human capital per person in the two countries as well as their capital/output ratios.
Human capital per person depends on education as measured by the number of years u at school in the spirit of Mincer (1974) :
Here v is a positive number estimated from labor market data and u is the duration of education measured in years at school. Without education (i.e., with u = 0), there would be no need to distinguish human capital from raw labor, so H = L. Taking logarithms and differentiating, we have (5) Therefore, v measures the proportional increase in human capital resulting from each additional year at school, a number like 0.1 according to several labor market and growth studies of advanced economies (see, e.g., Bils and Klenow, 2000) .
We take the capital/output ratio to be proportional to the investment rate I/Y in accordance with standard capital theory where without adjustment costs, I t is gross investment in year t, and δ is the rate of depreciation:
Here g is the rate of growth of output and capital.
Substitution of equations (4) and (6) into equation (3) gives (7) where s represents the investment rate I/Y. If we allow efficiency A, years of schooling u, and investment rates s to differ between Croatia and Latvia while the productivity of schooling v, the growth of the capital stock g, and deprecation δ are assumed the same in the two countries, we can express the ratio of per capita output y = Y/L in the two countries simply as follows:
(8)
B. From Output Per Person to Output Per Hour Worked
Our measure of economic performance, output per person, differs from the ideal conceptual measure, output per hour worked, which takes explicitly into consideration the work effort behind the output produced. By definition,
where Q is hours worked. Hours of work per person, Q/L, can be written as (10) where N is employment, U is unemployment, (N+U)/L is the labor force participation rate, Q/N is hours of work per employed person, and U/(N+U) is the unemployment rate. Replacing labor (i.e., population) L by hours worked Q in equation (3), we have (11) This means that (12) This simple extension of our model shows that hours worked per person -and thus, by equation (10), labor force participation, hours worked per employee, and unemployment -make an independent contribution to per capita output. The corresponding expression for output per hour worked, from equation (11), is (13) Equation (13) suggests that an increase in hours worked per person reduces output per hour worked, i.e., reduces labor productivity.
Our empirical strategy aims to provide a rudimentary quantitative assessment of the contributions of education, investment, and labor market institutions to the relative per capita incomes of Croatia and Latvia by evaluating the expressions under the square root in equation (12). This will enable us to attribute the rest of the income differential between the two countries to differences in efficiency, the term outside the square root on the right-hand side of equation (12). This requires a comparative review of a number of different economic, political, and social indicators to which we now turn.
Quantitative Evidence
We are aware that less than twenty years of macroeconomic data following the collapse of the Soviet Union that started in 1989 is too short a period to be amenable to a fully fledged long-run economic growth analysis in the spirit of, for example, Hall and Jones (1999) . Instead, against the background provided in the preceding section, we intend to ask whether the pattern of those macroeconomic variables that recent growth research has identified as potentially important determinants of per capita output and thereby also ultimately of long-run economic growth in crosscountry comparisons have behaved in ways that can shed some light on economic developments in Croatia and Latvia since independence. To this we add a simple growth accounting computation intended to suggest the relative contributions of investment, education, labor market institutions, and efficiency to the income differential between the two countries. Fully fledged growth accounting in which output growth could be traced in quantifiable proportions to all underlying inputs and to different aspects of the efficiency with which they were used is beyond the scope of this paper.
A. Investment, Education, and Exports
Let us start with domestic investment, a key determinant of the capital/labor ratio and of economic growth. Which of the two countries has put aside more resources for capital formation since 1990? As Figure 4 shows, both countries have seen a surge of machinery, equipment, and building investment. Croatia invested 21 percent of GDP in machinery and equipment on average from 1989 to 2007 compared with 27 percent in Latvia. These are the investment rates needed to evaluate the second term under the square root in equation (8).
The same logic applies to investments in human capital. Croatia and Latvia both embraced liberal trade policies around the mid-1990s but to a lesser extent than Estonia did after regaining independence. Still, Latvia opened up earlier than Croatia and started from a lower initial level of tariff incidence.
Likewise, import restrictions were dismantled in both countries, but, again, at a slower 8 Comparisons of data from the Soviet time with those of the post-Soviet period need to be taken with a grain of salt. Hence, the statement in the text has to be interpreted with care, especially if the cost of queuing, product range and quality, and so forth, is included in the GDP measure. 
B. Inflation and Exchange Rates
Price stability is also good for growth. After an initial bout of hyperinflation to eliminate the monetary overhang (and, in the case if Croatia, to finance the war of independence), both countries managed to bring inflation down to low single-digit numbers. However, as a result of severe overheating, Latvia's inflation rate jumped again to around 15 percent per year at the time of the bursting of the credit and real estate bubbles in 2007 and when the financial crisis struck (Figure 9 ). High inflation rates are a common occurrence in countries with demand and credit booms such as
Latvia (see Bakker and Gulde, 2010) . The de facto similarity of the exchange rate regime (see Figure 11) should not be surprising because, following renewed independence, both countries aspired to reintegrate into the world economy, and the EU in particular. 
C. Economic Structure
The dependence on agriculture as a source of income has declined rapidly in both countries. Both Croatia and Latvia managed to diminish the share of their agriculture in GDP down to slightly above (Croatia) or slightly below five percent (Latvia), which is only a little more than the EU average ( Figure 13 ). Croatia's low rank is surprising in view of the fact that the government of Croatia is trying hard to prepare for EU accession. The low rank reflects, among other things, the ongoing difficulties entrepreneurs have in gaining construction permits (114 th place) and processing the paper work for employing staff (163 rd place). We return to this issue below. To recapitulate, economic growth requires capital to be accumulated and to be efficiently used: real capital, human capital, foreign capital, and financial capital, all of which we have covered thus far, and also social capital to which we now turn.
D. Labor Markets
Our model in Section 2 permits us to consider labor market institutions as an independent potential determinant of growth (see Forteza and Rama, 2006) . The key is the distinction between labor and hours of work. More work increases output per person as in equation (12), but the need for a lot of work may also be a sign of inefficiency as in equation (13). By definition, as in equation (10) On a scale of democracy from minus ten to ten constructed by political scientists at the University of Maryland (Polity IV Project; see Marshall and Jaggers, 2001 ), Latvia has consistently scored a high eight since reclaiming its independence in 1991 compared with Lithuania's perfect ten and Estonia's six, which reflects the situation of the Russian minority in Estonia. For comparison, Croatia, well until after the war of independence scored poorly within a range of minus one and minus three ( Figure   20 ). Democracy, we think, is good for growth because, among many other things, it improves governance. Democratization can be viewed as an investment in social capital by which we mean the infrastructural glue that holds society together and keeps it working harmoniously and well. Social capital comprises several other ingredients, including trust, the absence of rampant corruption, and reasonable equality in the distribution of income and wealth (see Paldam and Svendsen, 2000) .
The idea here is that political oppression, corruption, and excessive inequalities tend to diminish social cohesion and thereby also the quantity or quality of social capital According to the World Bank's Enterprise Surveys, about the same proportion of managers surveyed in 2005 said they lacked confidence in the court system to uphold property rights (27 percent in Croatia, 21 percent in Latvia). Even so, in Croatia ten percent of the managers surveyed described crime as a major business constraint The sharp improvement should stimulate Croatian growth because corruption is not good for growth (Mauro, 1995; Bardhan, 1997) . On the other hand, the sharp deterioration does not bode well for Latvia. 
F. Accounting for the Income Differential
We now return to equation (12). We know the extent of the income differential that we want to understand. In 2008, Croatia's per capita GDP was 1.1 times larger than that of Latvia (recall Figure 1) . We have reported the average investment rates we need for the second term under the square root in equation (12), 0.27 in Latvia and 0.21 in Croatia.
Next, we need to count years of schooling. To this end, we could use existing measures of school life expectancy, defined by UNESCO as the total number of years of schooling which a child can expect to receive, assuming that the probability of his or her being enrolled in school at any particular future age is equal to the current enrolment ratio at that age. According to UNESCO, school life expectancy in 2008 was fifteen years in Latvia and fourteen in Croatia. We prefer to reassess the UNESCO measures of school life expectancy to cover the longest period for which fairly continuous data are available, i.e., 1999-2007, rather than just the final year. We do this by adding the number of years of primary, secondary, and tertiary education (nine, three, and five in Latvia and eight, four, and five in Croatia) At last, we need to quantify the third and last term under the square root in equation (12), hours of work per person, , defined in equation (10) as a multiple of the labor force participation rate, hours of work per employed person, and one less the unemployment rate. Using averages from Figure 15 (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) , Figure   16 ( 1996 -2007 ), and Figure 17 (1996 -2007 , we get for Croatia and for Latvia.
This is the information we need to assess the first term under the square root in equation (12).
Now that we have the numbers we need, let us plug them into equation (12) and solve for the implicit efficiency differential as a residual:
To complete the computation, we substitute this solution for the efficiency differential back into equation (12): (15) This back-of-the-envelope decomposition suggests that if the two-year difference in education measured by years of schooling were the sole difference between the two countries, education could by itself account for a 172 percent (i.e., 1/0.368 -1) education system adopted the Bologna system for higher education in 2005, i.e., a three-year bachelor and a two-year master. Prior to 2005 four years were needed to complete the first university degree (diploma). Sources: Ministry of Education and Science of the Republic of Latvia and Ministry of Science, Education and Sports of the Republic of Croatia. 13 The primary school-enrolment rates are net, and refer to the ratio of children of official school age who are enrolled in school to the population of the corresponding official school age. The secondary and tertiary rates are gross, and refer to the ratio of total enrollment, regardless of age, to the population of the age group that officially corresponds to the level of education in question. (Figures 9 and 10) , more manufacturing exports (Figure 14) , more economic freedom (Figure 15) , and longer lives (Figure 23 ), as we have discussed.
To sum up, our computation suggests that education matters a good deal more than investment or labor market arrangements for explaining the growth differential between Latvia and Croatia from 1991 to 2008 while some advantages in efficiency must be the reason why Croatia has managed to stay ahead. A decomposition of the efficiency differential between the two countries is beyond the scope of this paper.
Suffice it to say that intensive growth is what counts.
Before concluding, we must acknowledge the possibility that Latvia's rapid growth after 2000 was driven by excessive optimism fueled by unsustainable fiscal and monetary policies and was, therefore, bound to be reversed as happened when the financial crisis struck in 2008. The comparison of Croatia's actual economic trajectory and Latvia's road not taken with a less rapid rise and fall could no doubt result in a different decomposition of the income differential between the two countries than the one that we have presented. 
Conclusion
Our comparison of the development trajectories of Croatia and Latvia since 1991 suggests policy implications that seem to be of general relevance for many countries, but particularly for those that aspire to rapid economic growth to catch up with others.
In brief, rapid growth requires (i) Public policies that foster education and training, free trade, and domestic as well as foreign investment in a business-friendly environment.
(ii) Monetary and fiscal policies that support price stability and sound private banking and other financial intermediation, sustainable government budget positions, and international, consumer-friendly competition.
(iii) Sound and transparent societal institutions that support the rule of law.
(iv) Good governance in both the public sector and the private sector.
Further, in countries such as those under review, the prospect of EU membership may create favorable conditions for sound economic policies, rapid structural change, and institution building. Such an EU perspective may also help to forge a broad-based political consensus on the policy actions required for change.
In the 2000s until the financial crisis hit the two countries in 2008, Latvia grew nearly twice as rapidly as Croatia (around nine percent per year compared with close to five percent on average). As a consequence, Latvia nearly caught up with Croatia in terms of per capita GDP (recall Figure 2) . As far as Latvia's rapid growth is concerned, it was driven by domestic demand (net exports were a major drag on growth 14 What can account for the different growth performances? Returning to our classification of the sources of growth based on the aggregate production function presented in Section 2, we can summarize our main findings as follows:
), fed by rapid credit expansion fueled by capital imports. Bakker and Gulde (2010) suggest that countries with rapid credit growth and a boom in domestic demand face massive current account deficits, and suffer mounting external debt and soaring inflation. Latvia, in particular, was strongly affected, experiencing one of the strongest capital inflows among the new EU members. Disaster struck in 2008 when it became clear that the country's growth rate and its composition were no longer sustainable. Croatia's growth was less rapid and better balanced, credit expansion was more muted, and inflation was accordingly lower. It appears that a more cautious policy and, in a certain way, some rigidities in the banking system may be good for economic stability.
First, Latvia has invested more relative to GDP than Croatia, thereby fostering long-term growth. Net FDI, marginally higher in Latvia, could have also contributed.
Second, Latvia has invested more in education at all levels, thereby increasing the human capital stock. The buildup of human capital in Latvia relative to Croatia manifests itself in two extra years of schooling, and is reinforced by more intensive use of personal computers and of the internet. Both support rapid human capital accumulation.
Third, Latvia started earlier and more aggressively -even if it did so later and less intensely than Estonia -to raise economic efficiency, that is, total factor productivity, and thereby lay a basis for rapid long-run growth. These efforts started around the middle of the 1990s after the initial output decline had been reversed and hyperinflation had been brought down. 15 These efforts were, in particular, driven by Latvia's EU integration process. 
